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1.

Introduction

Attacks against buildings using a stationary or moving vehicle laden with large amount of explosive
have become the weapon of choice by some terrorist groups. Structural engineers today face a new
challenge and require methods and guidance on how to design structures to resist various hostile
acts.
Table 1 summarises some recent terrorist attacks on civilian buildings with bombs of variable
magnitudes and their methods of delivery. The devastating attack against the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995, the collapse of both WTC Towers in New York
in September 2001, the tragic events in Bali in October 2002, and the most recent bombing of the
Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004 have underscored the attractiveness and
vulnerability of civilian buildings as terrorist targets. These attacks have also demonstrated that
modern terrorism should not be regarded as something that could happen elsewhere. Any nation can
no longer believe themselves immune to terrorist violence within their own borders. The fact is that
the majority of government and civilian buildings continue to be vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Date

Site location

Method of
delivery

Approx. Charge
Weight
(TNT equivalent)

September,
2004

Australian Embassy, Jakarta,
Indonesia

Moving van
loaded with HE

150 kg

November,
2003

HSBC Bank, Istanbul, Turkey

Moving vehicle

May, 2003

Housing Compounds, Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia

Three cars
loaded with HE

Not available

October, 2002

Sari Club Bombing, Bali,
Indonesia

Car bomb in
front of building

1 kg TNT + 100 kg
fertilizer

December,
2002

Parliament House, Chechnya,
Russian Federation

June, 1996

US Military Complex, The
Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia

Two moving
trucks loaded
with HE
Truck bomb

April, 1995

Murrah Building, Oklahoma
City, USA

Stationary truck
in front of
building

150 kg

2000 kg
2000 kg
1800 kg

Table 1. Selected recent terrorist attacks with high explosives
This paper aims to introduce concepts that can help structural engineers and building owners
mitigate the threat of hazards associated with terrorist attacks on new and existing buildings. While
the issue of blast-hardening of structures has been an active topic with the military services, the
relevant design documents are restricted to official use only. A very limited body of design
documentation exists currently to provide engineers with the technical data necessary to design civil
structures for enhanced physical security. The professional skills required to provide blast resistant

consulting services include structural dynamics, knowledge of the physical properties of explosive
detonations and general knowledge of physical security practices.
Designing security into a building requires a complex series of trade-offs. Physical security
measures need to be balanced with many other design requirements such as fire protection, energy
efficiency, natural hazard mitigation, accessibility, and aesthetics. Because the probability of
terrorist attack against a specific target building is very small, security measures should not
interfere with daily operations of the building. On the other hand, because the effects of terrorist
attack could be catastrophic, it is prudent to incorporate measures that may save lives and minimise
business interruption in the unlikely event of an attack. Security design measures should be part of
an overall multi-hazard approach to ensure that the building behaviour in the far more likely event
of a fire, earthquake, or hurricane, is not worsened by the introduction of the security specific
measures.
The primary objective of protecting office buildings against terrorist attack is to save lives with the
focus on a damage-limiting or damage-mitigating approach rather than a blast-resistant approach.
This can be achieved by incorporating some reasonable measures that will enhance the life safety of
the persons inside the building and facilitate rescue efforts in the unlikely event of terrorist attack.
Structurally this could be accomplished by preventing catastrophic collapse of the building to
reduce the number of building occupants that become trapped under the structural debris.
Maintaining structural integrity of the building can also help protect occupants from the flying
debris and air-blast pressure of an explosion.
Better understanding what an explosion is and what it can do to a building are necessary for
developing physical security measures which are effective in mitigating the effects of a terrorist
attack. This paper reviews the general properties of a bomb blast, the concept of defence in depth
for an urban planning layout, the blast barriers, and preventing progressive collapse of a structure.
This paper will also discuss current state-of-the-art methods to enhance protection of the building
by incorporating low-cost measures into new buildings at the early stages of design.

2.

Explosion effects

An explosion is the rapid release of stored energy. This energy is released in part as thermal
radiation; the rest manifesting as shock waves that are combinations of air blast and ground shock.
The air blast is the main damage mechanism. Air blast has a primary effect, which is an ambient
over-pressure or incident pressure, and a secondary effect, which is the dynamic pressure or drag
load. The first effect is caused by the air blast that propagates at supersonic velocity, and
compresses air molecules in its path. As the shock wave encounters a rigid object (e.g. a building
wall), it is reflected thus amplifying the over-pressure by some significant factor between two and
up to thirteen. The air blast enters the building through wall openings and failed doors and
windows, affecting floor slabs, partitions, and content within the building. The shock waves
undergo diffraction as they interact with various surfaces, thus increasing or decreasing in pressure.
Eventually, the air blast subjects the entire building to over-pressure.
The pressures decay exponentially in time and with radial distance from the epicentre, measured
typically in several milliseconds. Diffraction effects, caused by building features such as re-entrant
corners may act to confine the air blast, prolonging its duration. Eventually, the shock wave
becomes negative, creating suction forces. Following the vacuum, air rushes in, creating dynamic
pressure or drag loading which manifests as a high velocity wind that propels debris generated by
the blast. In case of an external explosion, a portion of the energy is also imparted to the ground,

creating a crater and generating the ground shock that produces motions similar to high-intensity,
short-duration earthquake. Figure 1 illustrates the parameters of a typical blast wave.

Figure 1 Air-blast pressure time history and blast wave parameters
The following effects are characterised from a blast wave (see Figure 1):
• Magnitude of the overpressure or the peak pressure during the over-pressure phase of the blast
wave (Pso is the peak incident overpressure; and Pr is the peak reflected over-pressure).
• Impulse or duration of the over-pressure. Impulse is the area under the over-pressure time
history curve. Positive phase duration, t0, measures how long the over-pressure phase of the
blast wave lasts.
• Shape of the over-pressure pulse. Military high explosives will typically have a very high
shock value with near-zero rise-time, which then decays rapidly.
The peak blast pressure is a function of the weapon size and the cube of the distance called the
standoff. For an explosive threat defined by its charge weight and standoff, the peak incident and
reflected pressures and other blast wave parameters such as the incident and reflected impulse are
evaluated using charts available in military technical manuals or using specialised computer
programs such as CONWEP (Hyde, 1992).
2.1

Equivalent explosive weight

The charge weight of the explosive is typically measured in the net equivalent weight of TNT, as
TNT is used as the standard explosive in assessing blast effects. The most common home-made
type of explosive is fertiliser-fuel mixture or Ammonia Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO). ANFO’s average
equivalent weight factor to TNT is 0.82, or 82 percent the blasting power by equivalent weight in
TNT. Typical defensive design is for a vehicle laden with anywhere from 25kg to 2000kg of
explosive. For reference the explosive weight of the standard hand grenade has about 0.3-0.4kg and

the average sized ordnance deployed by aircraft during operation Desert Storm was about 500kg
“bunker busters”.
2.2

Blast loading

The key aspect of structural design to resist blast effects and progressive collapse is determining the
nature and magnitude of the blast loading. This involves assessing the amount and type of
explosive, as well as its distance from the building. Another factor is the level of security that can
be placed around and within the building. The blast threat may include a package bomb, a suitcase
bomb, vehicle-borne bomb, or some other means of delivery. The type of explosive is an important
factor because all explosives behave differently. Moreover, some types of explosives are easier to
obtain than others.
The overall effect of an explosion may be quantified by its charge weight, W, measured in
equivalent weight of TNT, and its distance from the building, or the standoff, R. The peak pressure
is a function of distance R divided by the cube root of the charge weight W. This is commonly
called and expressed as Scaled Distance = R / W1/3. Another way of viewing scaled distance and
pressure relationship is by Peak Pressure ∼ W / R3. This means that by doubling the standoff the
incident pressure is reduced by a factor of eight for a given weapon. This gives an indication of how
the damage to a building can be mitigated most effectively: keep large weapons as far from the
building as we possibly can.
Figure 2 illustrates the above relationship between explosive weight and standoff distance with four
incident pressure curves (5.0, 10.0, 20.0, 50.0 kPa). By entering the x-axis with the estimated
weight of explosive and the y-axis with a known standoff distance, the resultant effects of
overpressure could be determined. The vehicle symbols at the top of Figure 2 display the relative
size of the vehicle that might be used to deliver various quantities of explosives.

Figure 2 Incident pressure as a function of distance and explosive weight

2.2.1

Example: blast load on building facade

In this sample problem, an explosive device consists of 100 kg TNT and is located in a street 15
metres from a single office block. The blast load will be assessed in application to a double glazed
unit 1.5m wide by 2m high with its centre 12m above the ground. It is required to determine peak
reflected overpressure and reflected impulse for a point of interest on front elevation of office block
(see Figure 3).

Figure 3 Geometry of an office block used for 3-D numerical simulation.
Step 1. Charge weight W = 100 kg of TNT (hemispherical charge), h = 12m, and RG = 15m.
Step 2. For the point of interest:
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Step 3. Determine reflected blast wave parameters for Zh = 4.1 m/kg1/3. From TM5-1300 (US
Army, 1991):
Pr = 146 kPa
ir/W1/3= 154 kPa-msec/kg1/3; ir = 154x(100)1/3 = 715 kPa-msec
t0/W1/3 = 4.05 msec/kg1/3;
t0 = 4.05x(100)1/3 = 18.7 msec
If the peak load on a glazing unit is required for design purposes, the panel load is calculated as:
Load = 146kPa x 1.5m x 2.0m = 438 kN
Impulse = 715 kPa-msec x (1.5m x 2.0m) = 2145 kN-msec
2.3

Predicting damage to a building

Airblast pressures are usually several orders of magnitude greater than the loads for which the
building is designed. Fortunately, these only act for a fraction of a second on the building. It is
because of the short duration of the loading that is possible to design structures to withstand blast
loads. The extent and severity of damage and injuries in an explosive event cannot be predicted
with high degree of certainty. Past events show that the overall level of damage can be influenced
by the specific type of construction, the arrangement of buildings and their heights, the size of the
structure, the presence of fragment loading, and other factors. Despite these uncertainties, it is

possible to predict the expected extent of damage for a specific explosive event based on the size of
the explosive device, distance from the explosion, and information about the construction type of
the building. In addition, the extent of injuries can be correlated with the structural damage patterns.
Certain types of construction are highly blast resistant while some others are not. Damage is
prevalent for wood construction even at large standoff distances, which is due to the inherent
fragility of wood components to explosions. Conversely, reinforced concrete frames offer a high
level of blast resistance, even though some infill panels between structural columns may be
destroyed. The size of the structure relative to the bomb size is a significant factor in the amount of
damage inflicted. A small, strong masonry building may withstand damage better that a large, twostorey, lightly reinforced concrete building.
Damage to various building types can be calculated based on computer simulations and existing
blast damage assessment tools such as P-I diagrams for various structural elements (FACEDAP,
1994). One example of blast damage prediction for a typical steel pre-engineered building is given
in Table 2 (UG-2031-SHR, 1998).
Charge
Weight
(kg)

Distance for Specified Damage and Injury (m)
Minimal

Minor

Moderate

Heavy

Severe

25

26

21

16

11

6

100

50

40

31

25

16

225

76

61

50

40

27

450

116

90

70

59

44

1,800

238

189

143

122

91

18,000

747

625

433

372

229

Table 2. Pre-engineered Steel Building (one-storey, pre-engineered steel, 6 metres by 24 metres,
steel frames at 6 metres, corrugated steel roof on purlins).

3.

Methodology for protective design of buildings

The methods for protecting buildings against explosions have been in existence for several
decades. The design guidelines have been produced, particularly for high-risk projects such as
military facilities and embassies. In response to a potential threat of terrorist bombing attacks
and following the events of September 11, 2001, the private sector has became increasingly
interested to examine whether design methodologies and construction techniques developed for
military purposes could be beneficially applied to civilian structures.
Many of the existing buildings have been designed and built with minimum consideration of
protection against explosions. It is also unlikely that the building codes will fully incorporate blast
resistant design requirements in the near future. Without change of policy and greater awareness
among the engineering profession, new buildings will be designed and constructed in a similar
fashion.

It is agreed that the most effective way to protect a building against blast loads is to stop the
attack before it occurs. If the attack does occur, the measures must be employed to ensure that
the threat from explosions has minimal effect. This may be achieved by the implementation of a
series of redundant physical and operational security measures as well as through achieving
protection during the design stage. Considerations should be given how to:
• Minimise the likelihood and magnitude of attack by making the building an unappealing
target.
• Prevent catastrophic collapse of the building to save lives; the collapse is inevitable but must
be local.
• Protect the people and assets from the primary and secondary effects of explosion (air-blast
pressure, flying debris, etc).
• Provide shelter to the occupants of the building during an explosion and facilitate rescue and
evacuation efforts.
• Enable rescue and repair efforts to be performed after an attack.
A flowchart showing the methodology for protecting buildings against explosions is shown in
Figure 4. The flowchart presents the sequence of activities such that an effective approach for
protecting people, property and the business can be achieved.
Building type and dimensions

Perform threat assessment

Is protective
design required?

Provide preventive measures
(standoff, streetscape elements)

Explosion scenario (method of
delivery, charge, distance)

Calculate blast overpressure
and loads (charts, software)

Analysis of building response to
blast effects (SDOF, charts,
computer simulation)

Blast damage assessment
(p-i diagrams, ductility)

Is level of damage
acceptable?

Re-design structure
and/or components

Is design
practical?

Review damage
acceptance criteria,
protective measures

Carry out detailed design
including measures to avoid
progressive collapse

Figure 4 Flowchart of the methodology for protective design of buildings

3.1

Protective measures for buildings – defence in depth

Defence in depth is to provide several layers that attackers must breach before reaching the
protected facility. The concept is similar to peeling away successive layers of an onion to reach the
centre. The use of standoff distance as a defensive tool may be the most cost effective option, since
shock wave pressure decreases by a factor of 8, each time the standoff distance is doubled. To
create a protected space for the critical facilities, barriers will need to be erected to form a
perimeter. Entry into the protected area will be through controlled entry points. The main focus will
be to limit the vehicular traffic in and out of the protected area.
Orientation and building layout is also key in defence in depth. Two defensive issues should be
addressed: (a) denying the attackers a straight or direct route to the critical structure; and (b)
denying the attackers a clear line of sight to the critical structure. The first issue can be achieved by
building routes that require vehicles to reduce their speed or prevent acceleration and therefore
preventing use of their vehicle as ram. This can be accomplished with multiple turns or points
where vehicles must stop.
3.1.1

Maximise standoff distance

Maximising the standoff distance keeps the threat as far away from critical buildings as possible. It
is the easiest and least costly method for achieving the appropriate level of protection to a critical
structure. Many times, vulnerable buildings are located in urban areas where site conditions are
tight. When standoff distance is not available, the structure needs to be hardened to give the same
level of protection that it would have with a greater standoff. The best way to increase the distance
between a potential bomb and the critical building is to provide a continuous line of security along
the perimeter of the facility to keep all vehicles as far away from critical assets as possible. The area
within the standoff distance can be further partitioned (see Figure 5). The exclusive standoff zone
provides a higher level of protection. Using the concept that vehicles are able to carry significantly
more explosives than a person with a hand carry packages, the exclusive zone would be limited to
pedestrian traffic only. The non-exclusive zone standoff zone would permit entry and parking of
cars and trucks, after an initial search at an earlier entry control point.

Figure 5 Exclusive and non-exclusive standoff zones (US Air Force, 1996)

The U.S. Department of Defence minimum standard for effective standoff distance for primary
gathering buildings is 25 metres away from parking and roadways without a controlled perimeter,
but is reduced to 10 metres for the same facilities inside a controlled perimeter (UFC-4-010-01,
2002). This is based on the assumption of a stationary vehicle bomb attack and the facilities are
constructed of reinforced concrete or reinforced masonry. If the buildings were of light-weight
construction such as a metal pre-engineered building, then the standoff distances would need to be
increased.
3.1.2

Physical protective barriers

There are two categories of anti-ram barriers – passive (or fixed) vehicle barriers and active (or
operable) vehicle barriers. These components enclose the standoff zone. Passive vehicle barriers are
placed along the perimeter of the standoff zone where approach by land vehicle is possible. These
barriers have no moving parts and are in a continuous “ready” state all the time. The majority of
these are constructed in place.
Vehicle barriers are rated based on the kinetic energy resisted. The kinetic energy resistance
measures the capacity of a barrier to stop a vehicle of a particular gross weight at a given velocity.
The barrier rating is typically determined through crash testing of full-scale barriers but may also be
determined through detailed structural analysis.
Figure 6(a) contains typical details for concrete planters. To be considered anchored, the planter
must be embedded at least 0.5m into the foundation material. The traditional anti-ram solution is to
use bollards (see Figure 6(b)). Bollards are concrete-filled steel pipes that are placed using about
0.5m spacing along the curb to prevent vehicle intrusion. In order for them to provide resistance to
impact of a vehicle, the bollards need to be embedded into a concrete footing that is about 1.0-1.5m
deep. The height of planters and bollards should be as high as a car or truck bumper. An alternative
to a bollard is an anti-ram knee wall constructed of reinforced concrete with a buried foundation.
The wall may be fashioned into a base for a fence or the wall for a planter. The foundation of the
bollard and knee-wall system can present challenges. Unless the foundation can sustain the reaction
forces, significant damage may occur.

Figure 6 Passive barriers: (a) concrete planters construction; (b) bollards construction (US Army,
1994).

3.2

Preventing progressive collapse

Provisions in the applicable building codes do not give explicit requirements for the consideration
of blast and progressive collapse resistance, except for general statements about structural
redundancy, resilience and robustness. Because of the catastrophic consequences of progressive
collapse, it is prudent to include measures of mitigating the effects of progressive collapse into the
overall building design and give them the highest priority during the design process. Some issues
related to structural protection measures to mitigate damage due to progressive collapse are
summarised in a concise form below (US Dept of State, 1995):
• Buildings should be designed against progressive collapse using the indirect method, the
alternate-load-path method, or the specific local-resistance method.
• Structural damage without collapse of the building is an acceptable and practical design
parameter.
• Consider incorporating internal damping into the structural system to absorb the blast impact.
• Design floor systems for uplift in exterior bays that may pose a hazard to occupants.
• Symmetric reinforcement can increase the ultimate load capacity of the structure.
• Ductile details should be used for structural components to absorb the energy of a blast.
• Use two-way floor and roof systems.
• Avoid the use of masonry when blast is the threat. Masonry walls break up readily and
become secondary fragments during blasts.
• Use dynamic non-linear analysis methods for design of critical structural components.

4.

Conclusion

This paper has introduced several concepts that can be useful to structural engineers, building
owners, and site planners in mitigating the threat of hazards resulting from terrorist attacks using an
explosive-laden vehicle on new and existing buildings. The general properties of a bomb blast, the
concept of defence in depth for an urban planning layout, the blast barriers, and preventing
progressive collapse of a structure have been reviewed. The state-of-the-art methods to enhance
protection of the building by incorporating low-cost measures at the early stages of building design
have been addressed.
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